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Abstract 22 
Evolution of the industrialized society had led to a risk management policy in many domains. 23 
Assessment of health care risk in the case of infectious diseases often includes mathematical 24 
models. Results of modelling were used in France to design emergency plans against flu 25 
pandemic. We believe that models cannot predict the features of the future outbreaks 26 
because the intrinsic properties of an emergent pathogen and the ecosystem in which it is 27 
developing are very complex. Of course, prediction of future outbreaks is not possible 28 
without using models, but we think that it is an illusion to presently believe that emerging 29 
phenomenon can be anticipated by using only prediction from models. The recent pandemic 30 
caused by the novel A/H1N1 virus has confirmed the unpredictability of infectious diseases. 31 
The rapid evolution in several domains such as antimicrobial therapeutics, vaccine and 32 
hygiene conditions make comparison with past pandemics hard. The adherence of 33 
populations to prevention measures and immunisation campaigns are unpredictable. In 34 
addition, the presentation of pessimistic models is deleterious. They impress governments 35 
and provoke fears. There is a striking necessity to develop the number and the capacities of 36 
sentinel centres to take and adapt decisions based on timely available scientific information. 37 
38 
 Evolution of society had led to a risk management policy in many domains. The 39 
assessment of health care risk in infectious diseases, especially concerning future epidemics, 40 
often includes mathematical models which tentatively predict in silico the burden of the 41 
future outbreaks such as attack rate, dissemination, morbidity or mortality. Currently, 42 
models are designed to run with different scenarios, and probabilistic methods allow testing 43 
their performance in a number of situation. But the question asked by physicians, scientists 44 
and in fact everyone is “how many people will die, how many will be hospitalized?”. Such 45 
predictions from models were used in France to design the emergency plan against flu 46 
pandemic [1]. We believe that models cannot predict with acceptable accuracy the features 47 
of the future outbreaks because the intrinsic properties of an emergent pathogen and the 48 
ecosystem in which it is developing are very complex and unstable. Of course, prediction of 49 
future outbreaks is not possible without using models, but we think that it is an illusion to 50 
presently believe that emerging phenomenon can be anticipated by using only prediction 51 
from models. The recent pandemic caused by the novel A/H1N1 virus has confirmed the 52 
unpredictability of infectious diseases. 53 
 Seasonality of respiratory infections is a well-known phenomenon in temperate 54 
regions. Flu has long been associated with cold season, and the word "Influenza" comes 55 
from “influenza di freddo” in Italian that means “cold influenced”. A marked peak of 56 
respiratory infections occurs during cold winter months. Several mechanisms have been 57 
proposed to explain it, such as seasonal environmental changes (temperature humidity...), 58 
seasonal host-behaviour changes and seasonal changes in host physiology (melatonin, 59 
vitamin D...) [2-4]. However there is still no clear understanding of this phenomenon. In 60 
contrast, disease seasonality is less defined in tropical regions where a background of 61 
influenza cases is observed throughout the year on top of which epidemics occur at 62 
intermediate months between the influenza season in temperate countries of the Northern 63 
and Southern hemispheres [4]. On the top, none of yet proposed determinants can explain 64 
why the four last pandemics of influenza (1918, 1957, 1968, and 2009) did not initiate during 65 
the cold season. 66 
 Interference between several respiratory viruses affecting the spread of influenza 67 
was recently described in Europe and drastically modified the dynamics of the outbreak [5-68 
6]. In France and in Sweden, an epidemic of rhinovirus infections occurred after the start of 69 
school year, and delayed the onset of the A/H1N1 pandemic. We also observed in Marseille 70 
that the epidemic of Respiratory Syncytial Virus bronchiolitis, which happens usually just 71 
before the seasonal flu epidemic, occurred later in the season, just after that the A/H1N1 72 
pandemic started to decline. In addition interference between several Influenza viruses 73 
remains not properly known: at the beginning of the A/H1N1 pandemic, nobody was able to 74 
predict whether seasonal influenza strains (H3N2 and H1N1) would still provoke an epidemic 75 
wave or not.  76 
 In certain groups of population, the presence of cross-reactive antibodies against a 77 
new pandemic strain of influenza can heavily affect viral dissemination and therefore impact 78 
on the epidemiologic characteristics of the pandemic (total number of cases, age of the 79 
cases, number of severe cases, number of deaths, death rate, length of the phenomenon…) 80 
and seems unpredictable. The fact that the elderly were partially protected against the novel 81 
A/H1N1 [7-9] explains that the novel A/H1N1 virus infected mostly young people. In 82 
addition, at-risk groups may not be the same as for seasonal flu. For example, obesity was an 83 
undisputable independent risk factor of severity and lethality during the A/H1N1 pandemic 84 
[10-11]. 85 
 The inherent variability of new variants makes predictions difficult. Each pandemic 86 
virus has its own intrinsic properties which can evolve during the pandemic period. Then, 87 
intrinsic pathogenicity of new pandemic variants appears to be unpredictable. Data 88 
experimental derived from animal models must not be directly extrapolated to humans: in 89 
the A/H1N1 case, experiences with ferrets predicted a severity of pneumonia intermediate 90 
between that due to seasonal virus and the highly pathogenic avian H5N1 virus [12]. But in 91 
fact, the fatality rate of the novel A/H1N1 virus was relatively mild. 92 
 The novel 2009 H1N1 virus reminded the 1918 pandemic, also caused by a H1N1 93 
virus, despite totally distinct, which was associated with a large number of secondary 94 
bacterial co-infection which could explain partially the huge number of deaths [13]. Because 95 
of drastically different sanitary conditions nowadays, it is awkward to use the 1918 data as a 96 
basis for anticipating the spread, severity, and health consequences of present and future 97 
H1N1 pandemics. Currently, the use of antibiotics and anti-pneumococcal vaccines allow to 98 
efficiently combat the historically lethal bacterial co-infections. The availability of adapted 99 
vaccine and the rapid evolution on several domains such as antiviral therapeutics and 100 
hygiene conditions are likely to play a critical role in the burden of these new pandemic 101 
variants as well as the increase of air traffic in their spread. Some models take into account 102 
the impact of human interventions such as vaccine/antiviral delivery, isolation of infected 103 
patients, school closure, halting air traffic and non-pharmaceutical interventions. Moreover, 104 
it remains often difficult to evaluate their real impact even without applying any model. For 105 
example, it was only in the late nineties that hand washing indisputably demonstrated, 106 
through randomized trials, its efficacy to prevent inter-human transmission in developed 107 
countries [14-15]. In 2005, a randomized-trial in Pakistan confirmed it in low-income 108 
countries [16]. Furthermore, the efficacy of mask use, largely recommended during A/H1N1 109 
pandemic, to prevent respiratory infections is still to be clearly established by randomized 110 
trials [17-19]. Thereby, their introduction into models seems very tricky. 111 
 The vast majority of studies showed that immunization against influenza has a true 112 
impact in terms of hospitalization rate, global morbidity, influenza associated mortality as 113 
well as global mortality [20-26]. Intriguingly, during the immunisation campaign against the 114 
A/H1N1 pandemic virus, a large proportion of the population was reluctant to accept 115 
vaccination in some countries such as France and Germany. Human behaviours often are 116 
unpredictable and could vary among countries and vary with time. In France, the negative 117 
image provided by the mass media could have contributed to the low uptake of the A/H1N1 118 
vaccine. We observed and reported that in public hospitals of Marseille, the nurses were less 119 
immunised against the new A/H1N1 pandemic virus than against seasonal flu [27]. Fears of 120 
vaccination promoted by anti-immunization lobbies are largely relayed by the media and the 121 
doubts induced and amplified by mediatisation persists for a long time, even when scientists 122 
have demonstrated that there is no scientific evidence for suspicion. The association 123 
between multiple sclerosis and hepatitis B vaccine on one hand [28], and between autism 124 
and measles vaccine on the other hand [29] will be standing for many years to come, and 125 
any model is able to predict these events. One model can predict the willingness to accept a 126 
vaccine only for one specific situation. External factors cannot be included into models 127 
because they are often unknown until they appear. In France, the fact that medical 128 
information about the A/H1N1 vaccine was delivered and promoted primarily by politicians 129 
could have a counterproductive effect. Medical recommendations bypassing the medical 130 
system arouse  suspicion in the population [27]. 131 
 With hindsight, the recent pandemic reinforces the idea that presentation of 132 
pessimistic models mostly based on extrapolated hypotheses is deleterious. They impress 133 
governments and provoke fears. In another hand, it has been previously observed that 134 
pessimistic hypothesis about bioterrorism based only on speculations led governments to 135 
elaborate countermeasure plans with disproportionate measures. The Dark Winter 136 
operation, a bio-terrorist attack simulation, resembles movie script more than reality. Fears 137 
of a putative H5N1 avian flu pandemic amplified by pessimistic figures based on 138 
unsupported prediction constrained governments to implement emergency flu plans. Later 139 
on, these plans postulated that the fatality rate will be close to that observed in cases of 140 
A/H5N1 infection. For example, In France the 2009 emergency plan against pandemic flu 141 
predicted 91 000 to 212 000 deaths [1]. But A/H5N1 virus is still an almost pure zoonotic 142 
agent with transmission properties drastically distinct from those of the human adapted 143 
H1N1, H2N2 or H3N2 viruses. During the A/H1N1 pandemic in Marseille, no intermediate 144 
measure had been planified between (i) maintaining the organisation and logistics of the 145 
public hospital system as it was before the crisis, and (ii) the emergency opening of a 700 146 
bed-hospital exclusively dedicated for A/H1N1 infected patients. In the real-life situation, 147 
along 10 month pandemic period, more than 2,500 clinical specimens were laboratory-148 
documented: of these patients, around 11% were hospitalized and used simultaneously less 149 
than 50 beds at the peak of the pandemic. 150 
 In conclusion, infectious diseases remain unpredictable with mathematical models 151 
because pathogens and their ecosystem evolve continuously in a very unstable manner. Of 152 
course, some models which take into consideration the antiviral/antimicrobial therapies, the 153 
vaccines, the sanitary condition and the non-pharmaceutical interventions are useful to 154 
anticipate some logistic problems (quantity to purchase...) and can help to prepare the 155 
response to the future pandemics but they cannot predict with acceptable accuracy the 156 
major features of a future pandemic (number of cases, hospitalization, deaths...). The 157 
pessimistic predictions resulting from bioterrorism and the putative avian flu outbreak were 158 
published in highly-rated scientific journals. However they were neither supported by 159 
indisputable scientific evidence nor confirmed in real-time up to now. They fuelled fears in 160 
the population through amplification by the media, causing great concern amongst the 161 
public and the politicians. In order to fight future outbreaks and as a complementary 162 
approach of modelling methods, we need to reinforce the network of sentinel centres by 163 
increasing their timely detection/diagnostics capacities and by implementing a large variety 164 
of technological tools detecting abnormal events. The data from these sentinel centres 165 
should not be necessarily exhaustive but they require to produce sufficient amount of data 166 
to investigate emergence and epidemic tendencies. Coupled with the fact that data from 167 
hospital-based surveillance systems and Google searching tools are easily and timely 168 
available, such surveillance method system will not be very costly. Our capacity for analysis 169 
and laboratory documentation needs to be increased and better integrated; during a crisis 170 
all data must be rapidly shared using communication media such as internet [30]. Rapid 171 
communication of research using specific free media such as Promed and 'PloS Currents: 172 
Influenza' can also improve the information dissemination. In addition, very early data about 173 
a new variant could be incorporate in some models and then produce more accurate 174 
predictions. Furthermore, decision process should be based on timely available scientific 175 
data to allow decision makers to take real time decision. Precautionary principle should be 176 
advantageously replaced by alertness principle. 177 
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